T H E N I H C A T A L Y S T | N O V E M B E R D E C E M B E R 2005 |
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Research
Festival
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by Fran Pollner |
A
Starting Line-Up:
(left to right) Maribeth Eiden, chief, Section on Directed Gene Transfer,
Laboratory of Cellular and Molecular Regulation, NIMH; Peter Collins,
senior investigator, Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, NIAID; Nidia Oliveira,
visiting research fellow, NIMH; Brian Murphy, co-chief, Laboratory of
Infectious Diseases, and chief, Respiratory Viruses Section, NIAID; Carolyn Wilson, Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research, FDA; and Kanta Subbarao, senior investigator, Laboratory
of Infectious Diseases, NIAID
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Maribeth
Eiden
itemized some of the factors facilitating the spread of infectious diseases
in the 21st century: increased global travel, climate change, poverty, enlarged
populations, encroachment of domestic livestock, and inadequate surveillance
policies.
She then introduced a panel of investigators from NIAID,
FDA/CBER, and her own NIMH lab
who are working to control or respond to that spread with sophisticated vaccine
development and basic explorations into the mechanisms that enable viruses to
jump across species.
NIAID-MedImmune
CRADA
The global toll of the H5N1 avian flu virus from late 2003
to October 18, 2005, when Kanta
Subbarrao delivered her talk on vaccines against potential pandemic flu
strains, was 117 laboratory-confirmed human cases and 60 deaths against
the backdrop of 150 million infected birds and transcontinental spread.
The cases have all occurred in the context of a poultry
outbreak, direct human contact with infected poultry, and person-to-person transmission
of genetically identical virus within the family of an infected person.
There is no rapid human-to-human spread, Subarrao observed,
but there are reasons for concern:
n Poultry outbreaks are increasing.
n There is evidence of genetic drift, with new H5N1 genotypes
having arisen since its first appearance in 1997.
n Ducks, tigers, and leopards have died of H5N1 avian flu
and ferrets and cats can be infected in the laboratory.
n H5N1 viruses can infect people and cause severe disease,
and people have no immunity against it. Were it to become transmissible person-to-person,
it could cause a pandemic.
The "H"
in H5N1 stands for hemagglutinin, a key viral surface protein, of which there
are 16 subtypes that have been isolated from birds. There are currently vaccines
to prtect humans against H1 and H3.
Subbarao, a senior investigator in the Laboratory
of Infectious Diseases, NIAID, and Brian
Murphy, laboratory co-chief, are heading a team of NIAID scientists that
will work its way through all the rest H2 and H4 through 16 under
a CRADA agreement with MedImmune, Inc., of Gaithersburg, Md.
Each of these avian flu vaccines will be administered intranasally;
the live attenuated bird virus will contain the existing backbone of the influenza
A component of
MedImmune's FluMist® flu vaccine, a live virus that has undergone attenuating
mutations.
The project may take up to 10 years, Subbarao said in an
interview with The NIH Catalyst. She estimated that it would take about
two years to develop vaccines against each subtype and gather initial data from
the ensuing phase 1 clinical trial, which will involve healthy adults. The clinical
trials will be conducted in an inpatient setting during summers to limit the
risk of the expected small amount of shed vaccine virus combining with any circulating
wild-type influenza A viruses.
BUSH
USES NIH
VISIT On
November 1, President Bush paid his fourth visit to NIH this time
to call on Congress to approve a total of $7.1 billion in emergency funding
to arm the nation against pandemic bird flu. Joining Bush were DHHS Secretary
Michael Leavitt, other cabinet officers, some members of Congress, and
representatives of international bodies involved in responding to avian
influenza strain H5N1. After noting the difference between ordinary seasonal flu
and devastating pandemic avian strains that struck the world's immunologically
naive populations in 1918, 1957, and 1968, Bush said the country must
act preemptively. "There is no pandemic flu in our country or in
the world at this time, but if we wait for a pandemic to appear it will
be too late to prepare." World health experts see no signs H5N1 has yet evolved the
capacity to be transmitted from person to person essential for
a pandemic but they are wary of the strain because of its immunological
novelty and formidable 50 percent mortality in people infected through
direct contact with birds. Citing the substantial 2003 toll of SARS in
dollars and lives, Bush said, "A global influenza pandemic that infects
millions . . . could be much worse." To head off such a fate and simultaneously equip
the country against other flu strains and bioterrorist hazards
Bush called on Congress to approve a $7.1 billion legislative package
to support: n Global biosurveillance and disease containment ($251 million) n Federal purchase and stockpiling of an avian flu vaccine
currently in clinical trials ($1.2 billion for 20 million doses) n Federal purchase and stockpiling of two antiviral medications
($1 billion) n Grants to cut the time needed for vaccine development and
production ($2.8 billion) n Liability protection for the vaccine makers n Planning and coordination of local, state, and national
efforts for responding to health emergencies ($583 million) Bush said a cache of first-generation avian flu vaccine,
like stockpiles of Tamiflu and Relenza antivirals, would be given to "first
responders" and populations especially vulnerable to the flu if
a pandemic broke out. The hope for grants to U.S. pharmaceutical companies is
creation of production "surge capacity" and egg-free culture
techniques that would enable them to bring on-line a new flu vaccine
sufficient to immunize the nation within six months of the start
of a pandemic. For
the present, Bush urged everyone to get their annual shots against garden-variety
seasonal flu. "I had mine," he said. n |
Closing In
On Dengue and West Nile
Murphy and his colleagues in the NIAID
Laboratory of Infectious
Diseases have been working on live attenuated vaccine constructs against
two flaviviruses dengue and West Nile.
Murphy is aiming to create a tetravalent
vaccine aganst the four dengue serotypes that are responsible for 50
million infections a year.
Meanwhile, the team has introduced
a deletion mutation (delta 30) into each of the four wild-type serotypes to
achieve attenuation; thus far, good results have been seen with two (DEN1 and
DEN4) of the constructs.
The attenuated recombinant DEN4 construct,
for instance, "induced good antibody titers" in tests with 80 human
volunteers, Murphy said, adding that mild neutropenia and rash were the notable
but not dangerous side effects and systemic symptoms were rare.
A second approach, which involves making
antigenic chimeric viruses between the DEN4 delta30 virus and the DEN2 or DEN3
wild-type virus, has generated good vaccine candidates for these two serotypes. A tetravalent vaccine
with these four DEN viruses looks good in monkeys, Murphy said.
Preliminary results in monkeys suggest
that a boost at day 30 does not elicit a secondary antibody response; however,
a four-month interval, he said, was
effective at boosting the antibody response against each of the four serotypes.
Especially significant in low-income
countries, Murphy added, is that the equivalent of "one flask could immunize
100,000 inexpensively." He anticipates initiating clinical studies of a
tetravalent dengue vaccine in 20062007.
The team, led by Alexander
Pletnev, is taking a similar approach in developing a vaccine for West Nile
virus, which causes "a couple of thousand" infections a year in the
United States. Safety studies in mice are encouraging, and one chimeric construct
in early human testing was found to raise protective antibodies in seven of
nine volunteers in the absence of any symptoms.
Getting the Drop
On Respiratory Viruses
Peter
Collins, a senior investigator working with Murphy and other NIAID researchers,
discussed his work developing an intranasal vaccine vector for highly pathogenic
viruses such as SARS, Ebola virus, and avian flu virus.
Initial studies have used live attenuated
human parainfluenza virus (PIV3), an important cause of respiratory tract disease
in infants and children, as a vector.
PIV3 has a track record: First, the
NIAID team used recombinant DNA techniques to develop live attenuated PIV3 strains;
a PIV3 intranasal vaccine is currently
in clinical trials. The researchers developed the further strategy of using
attenuated PIV3 as a vector to express the protective antigens of additional
pediatric viral pathogens, such as human respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).
This bivalent PIV3/RSV vaccine is also now in clinical trials sponsored by MedImmune.
Collins described how attenuated PIV3
can also be used to express protective antigens of highly pathogenic agents
such as SARS and Ebola virus.
The intranasal route, by drops or nasal
spray, has the advantage of directly stimulating local respiratory tract immunity,
as well as systemic immunity a clear plus because the respiratory tract
frequently is the portal of entry and egress for viruses; and for respiratory
pathogens, it is the major site of viral replication and disease.
Using the SARS-S glycoprotein alone,
an intranasal PIV3 vector provided protection against the SARS coronavirus in
tests with rodents and nonhuman primate. In addition, an intranasal PIV3 vector
expressing the Ebola GP glycoprotein protected guinea pigs against an otherwise
lethal dose of Ebola virus.
Although these vectored vaccines have
promise for use in infants and young children, they probably will not be effective
in adults, who have naturally acquired immunity that will restrict the replication
of the vector, Collins observed.
Therefore, the investigators are developing
nonhuman PIV viruses as vectors, such as low-virulence strains of Newcastle
disease virus (NDV). In initial studies, NDV expressing a test antigen proved
to be both highly attenuated and highly immunogenic as an intranasal vaccine
in nonhuman primates.
Unearthing Ebola's
The world first became aware of the
Ebola virus in 1976; in the past 10 years, there have been 15 Ebola virus outbreaks
notably in Congo (now Zaire), the Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire.
A natural reservoir has not been identified;
incubation is five to seven days; symptoms start with generalized ague and progress
to disseminated intravascular coagulation, with death in 5090 percent
of cases.
"But survivors develop antibodies
against the virus, and this is the basis for a vaccine strategy," said
Carolyn Wilson,
of the FDA Center for Biologics Research and Evaluation. (She noted that Nancy
Sullivan and her colleagues at the Vaccine
Research Center have developed a DNA-prime/adenovirus vectorboost
Ebola vaccine currently in clinical trials.)
Working with "the Zaire virus,"
Wilson's lab has been focusing on an Ebola vaccine strategy that targets conserved
domains. They've been mining the glycoprotein section the heavily glycosylated
GP1, which mediates receptor binding, and GP2, which mediates fusion. They used
site-directed mutagenesis to functionally screen 15 amino acids from the GP
domain and found two that are critical for viral entry and "are conserved
across all filovirus strains, including Ebola and Marburg," Wilson said.
Further, Wilson showed that a peptide
derived from one of these conserved domains was able to block infection by strains
of Ebola virus. Now armed with "proof of concept," the team is continuing
its investigations with these two conserved amino acids F88 and F159.
How Much
Can a Koala Bear?
Nidia
Oliveira, a visiting research fellow at the NIMH Laboratory
of Cellular and Molecular Regulation, traced the meanderings and permutations
of a retrovirus that jumped from feral mice in southern Asia to Old World primates
to a New World pet primate in San Francisco and more recently
has been identified in koalas in Australia, where it has gained its greatest
lethality.
About 60 percent of koala bear mortality
is attributable to neoplasia. Infected koala bears have a neoplastic disease
rate that correlates with viral load. The KoRV retrovirus, Oliveira said, has
been isolated in 100 percent of Queensland koalas "it's in their
genomes," she said, noting that the rate is about 30 percent elsewhere
in southeastern mainland Australia.
Asian rodents are the reservoir for
the GALV-like virus that emerged to infect gibbon apes in Thailand and became
WMV in woolly monkeys and KoRV in marsupials.
Sequence comparisons establish the lineage, Oliveira said, noting that GALV, WMV, and KoRV use the same receptor PIT1 in gaining entry, but that KoRV also uses orthologs that GALV and WMV are unable to use. The KoRV envelope, she said, has an extremely broad host range, and the challenge now is to discern what part of the envelope accounts for that range and for the virus' species-jumping ability. n